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where there is "any ... reason justifying relief from the operation of
the [final] judgment" provided that the motion is made within a
reasonable time or, in some cases, within 6 months after final judg-
ment. 1 Since a writ of error must be issued within 3 months of final
judgment,22 it is apparent that, prior to Coerber, after 3 months had
expired, the right to review was lost, even though relief in the trial
court under 60(b) was not yet foreclosed. By adopting the federal
interpretation concerning reviewability of an order denying relief
from a default judgment, Coerber has extended the period within
which litigation will terminate. However, by deciding that the lower
court's order denying a rule 60(b) motion is a final reviewable judg-
ment as defined by the Colorado rules 23 the supreme court has af-
forded a party who has a meritorious defense the opportunity to
obtain substantial justice when it is obvious that the trial court has
abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the judgment.
Dennis J. Falk
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - TAx FRAUD - APPLICABILITY OF
MIRANDA SAFEGUARDS TO A CRIMINAL TAX SUSPECT. - Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
Defendant Mathis was serving a prison sentence in the Florida
State Prison for a conviction unrelated to tax charges. While a
prisoner, a regular agent1 of the Internal Revenue Service elicited from
Mathis documents and oral statements concerning tax returns pre-
viously made by Mathis. Mathis was not advised "that any evidence
he gave the Government could be used against him, and that he
had a right to remain silent if he desired as well as a right to the
presence of counsel and that if he was unable to afford counsel one
would be appointed for him.''2 Suspecting fraud, the regular agent
referred the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service. When agents of the Intelligence Division contacted Mathis,
he was advised of his rights. At his trial, Mathis, relying solely on
Miranda v. Arizona,3 sought to suppress the documents and statements
arguing (1) that throughout the investigation there was a possibility
2 1 COLO. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
221d. rule 111 (b).
23 Id. rule 111(a) (1).
I A regular agent is an Internal Revenue Service agent concerned with civil tax audits
as opposed to a special agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service concerned primarily with criminal investigations of tax fraud and evasion. See
H. BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION §§ 3.3, 3.3-1, 3.3-2 (3d ed. 1963).
2 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1968).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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of subsequent criminal prosecution, and (2) that because he was
incarcerated at the time, the protection of Miranda was required from
the outset.' The government asserted the inapplicability of Miranda
to Mathis in that "(1) . . . these questions were asked as a part of a
routine tax investigation where no criminal proceedings might even
be brought, and (2) that the petitioner had not been put in jail
by the officers questioning him, but was there for an entirely separate
offense.') The trial court rejected defendant's argument and the
circuit court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded.
-[T]ax investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions .. 6
The Court declared, "We find nothing in the Miranda opinion which
calls for a curtailment of the warnings to be given persons under
interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person is in
custody."' "We reject the contention that tax investigations are im-
mune from the Miranda requirements for warnings to be given a
person in custody."8
I. DEVELOPMENTS: FROM Escobedo TO Mathis
In examining this subject, it is essential to view the treatment
the courts have accorded the issue since Escobedo v. Illinois. His-
torically, the courts have been reluctant to apply the procedural
protections of Escobedo and Miranda to criminal tax cases. In the
period between Escobedo and Miranda, the courts were content to
hold Escobedo inapplicable to such situations, predicated upon either
a tenuous distinction as in Kohatsu v. United States, "o or upon an
obvious misapprehension of then applicable law, as in United States
v, Spomar. "
It was the Ninth Circuit in Kohatsu that articulated the elements
which they felt distinguished Escobedo from a criminal tax case.
The appellant there argued that evidence was admitted in violation
of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments because it was obtained
after the investigation had reached the "accusatory stage" without
his being warned or advised of his rights. He contended that a
"routine civil tax investigation" undergoes a fundamental change
when (1) a revenue agent discovers facts indicating substantial
unreported income, and (2) the facts are such that the revenue
agent suspects fraud.... IW]hen these events occur, the investiga-
4 Mathis v. United States, 376 F.2d 595, 596 (5th Cir. 1967).
5 391 U.S. at 4.
9 Id.
7 Id. at 4-5.
8Id. at 4.
9 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
11 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965).
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tion "has begun to focus on a particular suspect" and that from that
point "government agents have a duty to inform the taxpayer of
his right to counsel, and that they must not elicit further incriminat-
ing evidence from the taxpayer until he has been informed of his
constitutional rights in specific, understandable terms."'
2
Kohatsu contended the investigation focused on him at least from
the time the special agent was brought into the case. However, the
court reasoned thus:
The Supreme Court in Escobedo referred to an unsolved crime. The
existence of the crime was apparent. The police were seeking to
identify the offender. The accused had been taken into custody.
In the instant case the essential question to be determined by the
investigations of the revenue agents was whether in fact any crime
had been committed. The accused had not been indicted or
arrested.la
Subsequently, in a terse per curiam decision, the same court relied
solely on Kohatsu to determine that investigation by a special agent
did not constitute the accusatory stage.
1 4
The misapprehension of law in avoidance of Escobedo was, as
referred to above, the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Spomar. " The appellant, Spomar, asserted that his constitutional
rights under the fourth and fifth amendments were violated because
the agents failed to inform him of his right to refuse to answer
questions and produce records. The court's holding was that "Revenue
Agents, during the course of an investigation, have no duty to apprise
a taxpayer that he need not furnish requested information and that
if he does ... it may be used against him in criminal proceedings.'1
6
This holding came six months after the Court in Escobedo spoke
of "his [the suspect's] absolute constitutional right to remain silent"' 7
when "the investigation . . . has begun to focus on a particular
suspect..8. ""
With the advent of Miranda, replete with its well-known text
and footnote 4 defining custody,19 courts had much firmer ground
on which to posit their stand of maintaining criminal tax cases
12 351 F.2d at 900.
13 Id. at 901. The court in Kohatsu cites Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770 (9th
Cir. 1964), in which similar reasoning was used to avoid application of Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and Escobedo to a mail fraud case. Kohatsu was
relying on Massiah as well as Escobedo.
14 Rickey v. United States, 360 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1966).
15 399 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965).
16 339 F.2d at 942.
17 380 U.S. at 491.
18 Id. at 490.
19 384 U.S. at 444 & n.4. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at n.4. For an excellent
analysis of the Miranda requirements see Note, Legal Limitations on Miranda, 45
DENVER L.J. 427 (1968).
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outside the ambit of otherwise expanding procedural safeguards.
The overwhelming majority of courts that considered the issue took
up a nearly uniform incantation.2" Typical of these holdings is, "The
language of Miranda makes it clear that there must be some form of
detention, some type of in-custody situation .... 21 The circuit
courts in Frohmann v. United States
2 2 and Spinney v. United States
23
adopted the same rationale. In Frohmann the court stated that "in
any event, internal revenue agents in the investigatory phase of
a case, and prior to custody, have the right to make inquiry of a
taxpayer without the formalities which Escobedo and Miranda may
now require for custody situations.''24 Similarly, the court in Spinney
found that the defendant in responding to a letter from the Internal
Revenue Service for an interview "was not deprived of his freedom
of action at all. He was not compelled to appear at the interview
or answer questions. He did both voluntarily.
' 2 5
The position of rendering Miranda inapplicable to criminal tax
cases was not monolithic. 26 In United States v. Kingry,27 Miranda
was applied fully to a criminal tax prosecution. That court implied
that it did not recognize any difference between a criminal tax case
and any other criminal case.28 In Kingry the defendant was not
advised of his right to have an attorney.29 A special agent had con-
ducted the investigation from its inception. The defense moved to
suppress the evidence based on Miranda, and the motion was granted.
In argument, the government strenuously advanced the "custody"
concept of Miranda, but the court avoided this point. The court
urged three things: (1) Why advise the suspect of part of his rights
20 See United States v. Bachman, 267 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Pa. 1966) ; United States
v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stern v. Robinson, 262 F. Supp.
13 (W.D. Tenn. 1966); United States v. Schlinsky, 261 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass.
1966) ; United States v. Hill, 260 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
21 United States v. Hill, 260 F. Supp. 139, 142 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
2 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1968).
- 385 F.2d 908 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
24 380 F.2d. at 835.
25 385 F.2d at 910. The question of "voluntariness" will be discussed in Part III infra.
26 Prior to Miranda, United States v. Schoenburg, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 348, 353 (D.
Ariz. 1966), applied Escobedo to a tax situation. The court held the sixth amendment
right attached "at the time of the Special Agent's physical entry into the case ......
The court based this opinion on the "critical stage" of the proceedings test of
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963).
27 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 762 (N.D. Fla. 1967).
28 Id. at 769.
29 In the voir dire of the government's witness - the special agent - defense counsel
adduced:
Q: "And did you, at that time, tell him that he had a right to consult with






(the right to remain silent) but not all of them? (2) The court will
not except tax cases from other crimes; and, in referring to the
waiving of rights, (3) "[I1t is not free and voluntary unless it was
done with the proper information and knowledge and advisedly.""0
In a memorandum opinion by Judge Will, deciding United
States v. Turzynski,3l the issues of "custody" and "accusatory stage"
were thoroughly and ably discussed. Regarding "custody" as being
that incident which gives rise to the right of procedural safeguards,
the Turzynski court observed:
That the Court did not intend the custody standard to be raised to
constitutional significance seems clear from a reading of the total
opinions in both Escobedo and Miranda. Both cases involved
custodial interrogations. In both cases, as in others decided with
Miranda, the detention of the suspect permitted the inference that
the police suspected him of being the perpetrator of the crime under
investigation. Detention constituted tangible evidence that the ad-
versary process had begun.
The inception of the adversary process was the core of the
Court's concern in Escobedo and Miranda.
3 2
By thus dealing with "custody," the court had "leapfrogged"
Miranda and found itself in the flexible, but nebulous, realm of
Escobedo. 3 At this juncture the court criticized the Kohatsu distinc-
tion as "logically irrelevant for purposes of determining when the ad-
versary process has begun .... What matter if the culprit be known
before the crime or the crime before the culprit.
' 3 4
The Turzynski court, free of its "custody" fetters, attached the
protective safeguards of Miranda where it saw fit. It found that
"[t]he administrative organization of the Internal Revenue Service
offers at least one clear point at which the adversary process can
be said to begin in criminal tax investigations. It is at this point when
the case is turned over to the Intelligence Division .... ,,-3 It was
at this point that the court held the Miranda advisement must be
given. This holding was cited favorably and was adopted in substance
in the memorandum opinion granting a motion to suppress in United
States v. Wainwright."8
30 Id. at 768.
31268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Il. 1967).
32 Id. at 853.
33 For a better grasp and fuller appreciation of the custody issue, it is well to be aware
of what has taken place in nontax cases. One criteria frequently employed by courts
to determine whether the suspect is in custody is illustrated in Mares v. United
States, 383 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 1967): "Miranda is inapplicable because the
defendant was not under arrest and was free to continue the interviews or leave as
he saw fit." (Armed robbery case).
34 268 F. Supp at 852-53. Speaking to this same point, Judge Arraj observed that it
"is a distinction without a difference." United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp.
129, 132 (D. Colo. 1968).
35 268 F. Supp. at 852.
36 284 F. Supp. 129 (1968).
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In examining the three cases that have applied Miranda (ex-
cluding Mathis) as well as the one applying Escobedo, 87 one sees
two common threads running through all four cases. They are (1)
avoidance of a "traditional" construction of "custody," '8 and (2)
attachment of the procedural rights at the point of the special
agent's entry into the case.
II. Mathis v. United States: ITS IMPACT AND RESULTS
Under the Mathis rule, applying the safeguards of Miranda
only upon "custody" as currently understood and defined, how much
protection is extended the criminal tax suspect? The criminal tax
prosecution system as it exists and the law at its present stage compels
the answer- precious little!
The basic reason for the modicum of protection is that an
extremely insignificant number of suspects are placed in custody
for a tax crime. "[A] tax evader is usually well-rooted in his com-
munity ... [a]nd [his] crime causes no alarm for anyone else's
physical or moral safety." 9 Beyond this distinction it has been
pointed out that other contrasts make the tax criminal unique."
It is indeed regrettable that a case with a fact pattern as unique
to the majority of cases as Mathis would be deemed the case on
which to propound the law for tax fraud cases. The Court has
certainly had numerous opportunities to hear cases in closer con-
formity to the norm of tax cases.
41
In the wake of Mathis, an answer to a basic policy question
must be sought. Will Miranda be applied in a manner designed to
37 United States v. Schoenburg, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 348 (D. Ariz. 1966).
30 The custody issue is handled in Turzynski by meeting the question head-on, in
Wainwright by substantially ignoring it, and in 'Kingry by totally neglecting it.
30 Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44
TAXEs 660, 661 (1966).
4 Hewitt states that:
(1) In most instances, the crime occurs, and the investigation shifts to dis-
covering the perpetrator. In tax fraud, the suspect is known; the investigation
centers on whether or not a crime has been committed.
(2) With most criminals, flight and further detrimental conduct are im-
portant considerations. In tax fraud, neither of these possibilities generally
concerns the government.
(3) Most criminals can recognize their situation through the visibility of a
uniformed policeman. The tax evader cannot, because he never knows by the
ordinary clothes and innocent title that a special agent is just like any other
law enforcement official.
(4) Many ordinary criminals are well aware of their constitutional rights,
having participated in, or been close to, the criminal process previously.
The ordinary tax evader, on the other hand, is experiencing his first, and
usually last, contact with the criminal law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
41 See, e.g., Frohmann v. United States, 380 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 976 (1968); Thomas v. United States, 370 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967); Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966) ; United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d
941 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965).
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accomplish its original objectives -affording protection for the
individual's constitutional rights -or is it to degenerate into a
sterile, mechanical rule, programmed only to "custody"?
The use of custody in the milieu of its original application in
Miranda has proved to be a viable objective standard by which to
attach the right of procedural safeguards, but it should remain just
that. As stated by the court in Turzynski, "That the Court did not
intend the custody standard to be raised to constitutional signif-
icance,"412 is as it should be. To rigidly adhere to the custody standard
"would lead to the anomalous conclusion that a person suspected
of bank robbery, sale of narcotics, murder, rape or other serious
crime is entitled to greater protection of his constitutional rights
than a person suspected of violating the internal revenue laws."4
The validity of this remark rests on the fact that very few tax suspects
are ever placed in custody as that term is now construed.
Since Mathis applies the Miranda safeguards at least at the
point of custody, defendants undoubtedly will attempt to incorporate
the issue of custody in tax cases. The questions expected to be raised
frequently will be: (1) Is an interview of a suspect in his home or
office by a special agent within the meaning of "custody"? and (2)
Is a "question and answer" session in the Internal Revenue Service
office, in response to a letter,44 truly volitional?45 These questions
will have to be answered in future cases. Perhaps the ultimate issue
has been broached by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Thomas v.
United States,46 where the Court denied certiorari: "I would grant
this petition on the fourth question. . . .This is not an in-custody
case, but it is coercive examination of a taxpayer at a critical pre-
liminary hearing, so to speak, and the question presented apparently
is a recurring one.'"" What is implied in the Douglas dissent may
well be the answer to providing protection to the criminal tax
suspect equal to that accorded a suspect of other crimes; that is, to
42 268 F. Supp. at 853.
4 3 Id. at 850.
44See Spinney v. United States, 385 F.2d 908, 909 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 921 (1968). This case sets out the Internal Revenue Service letter that is
substantially standardized and in common use.
45 In this regard the court in United States v. Carlson, 260 F. Supp. 423, 427 (E.D.N.Y.
1966), said: "[Elvery other case of interrogation by a government presents, if in
diluted form, an underlying inequality of confrontation .. " See United States v.
Gower, 271 F. Supp. 655 (M.D. Pa. 1967) (question and answer session in an
IRS office where an inadequate advisement was given resulted in the suppression of
evidence). "Deprivation of freedom of action . . . must be evaluated in the light of
what influence the atmosphere and surroundings of governmental oriented facilities
had on the free choice of the person being interrogated." Id. at 660. But see United
States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965)
Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967).




attach the Miranda rights at a point prior to custody in recognition
of the uniqueness of criminal tax cases vis-a-vis other criminal cases.
Another reason compelling the conclusion that Mathis provides
an inadequate standard is that, for the critical period prior to custody
(if in fact there is any custody), courts are accustomed to use the
"voluntariness" rule. This rule is "whether appellant [taxpayer]
freely gave his consent to have his records examined,""8 and whether
there was any "misrepresentation, fraud, deceit or misconduct on the
part of the agents to gain . . . consent .... -4 Kohatsu also applied
this standard for admissibility.50 This test is applied where no advise-
ment of rights is given the suspect by the agent.
The concept of this test seems to fly in the face of Johnson v.
Zerbst "' which held, "The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of
a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting
from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights ....
The Turzynski decision stated that the Court in Miranda "logically
pointed out that it is impossible voluntarily to waive a right or
privilege you are unaware you possess. ' 53 Miranda itself required
the waiver to be made voluntarily, "knowingly and intelligently."54
The Miranda Court further asserted: "No amount of circumstantial
evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will
suffice .... Only through... a warning is there ascertainable as-
surance that the accused was aware of this right."55 If this "volun-
tariness" rule persists in the wake of Miranda, the conflict cannot
long be tolerated. The Court will have to resolve it, and in so doing,
will either resolve the Miranda application vis-a-vis the tax case or
further complicate the issue.56
III. OTHER POSSIBILITIES BEYOND Mathis
In light of this analysis, What then are the possible alternatives
for the stage at which procedural safeguards should attach? The de-
4 8 United States v. Spomar, 339 F.2d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
975 (1965).
49 Id.
5 0 Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011
(1966). See also Greene v. United States, 296 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1961); United
States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cif. 1959), cert denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959);
Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955).
51 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
5 2 Id. at 465.
53 268 F. Supp. at 851.
54 384 U.S. at 479.
55 Id. at 471-72.
56 See United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 854 (N.D. Ill. 1967), stating
that the voluntariness rule is based upon Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613
(1896), and that this rule was "overruled by Miranda." If this is so, the issue may
not be very troublesome.
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cisions in the Kohatsu line of cases, holding that Miranda has no ap-
plication to criminal tax cases, has been rejected by Mathis. The ap-
proach of Schoenburg, Kingry, Turzynski, and Wainwright may pro-
vide an effective objective standard of when the right to procedural
safeguards attaches. This approach, however, is not without its inher-
ent weaknesses. The critical nature of the period surrounding the shift
from a civil investigation to a criminal investigation cannot be
doubted. "Although 'on paper' the division of responsibilities be-
tween the revenue agent and the special agent is clear,. . . in practice
this division could not be ironclad and the agents must work together
as a team."
57
Herein lies one of the most serious "traps" as far as the taxpayer
is concerned, particularly where in his eyes a "routine audit" is being
conducted, when as a matter of fact the revenue agent alone or in
conjunction with a special agent may be laying further groundwork
for a subsequent full-fledged criminal tax-evasion investigation. 58
These factors plus the ability to manage and control "when the case
is turned over to the Intelligence Division"59 may not constitute
such a "clear point at which the adversary process"6 ° begins, as
thought in Turzynski.
It may be realistically remote, but it is not inconceivable, that
the right could attach at the time of initial contact by the revenue
agents. The largest obstacle to this is the statutory authorization
given to agents to investigate taxpayers.6" Concededly, attaching the
right at this early stage may not be desirable for any of the parties
concerned for several reasons. One reason is that the audit frequently
results in a refund to the taxpayer, and to alarm him and incon-
venience him by his getting an attorney unnecessarily is not warranted.
However, a case can be made for the rights to attach upon initial
contact, because "tax investigations frequently lead to criminal
"162prosecutions ....
In referring to the government's asserted distinction in Mathis
between a routine tax investigation and one leading to criminal
prosecution, Justice Black said, "These differences are too minor and
shadowy to justify a departure from... Miranda . 6.8.."63 It has also
been said that "every other case of interrogation by a government
presents, if in diluted form, an underlying inequality of confronta-
57 H. BALTER, supra note 1, § 3.32, at 16 (footnote omitted).
58 Id. n. 29.
59 United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 852 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
60 d.
1 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602.
62 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
6 Id. at 4.
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tion,'"64 and given the cooperation between the regular agent and
the special agent just discussed, the interview "is a coercive exam-
ination of a taxpayer at a critical preliminary hearing .... .- 6 On
this point, it was said, "I can see no difference between a search
conducted after entrance has been gained by stealth or in the guise
of a business call . . . [or] under the guise of an examination for
purely civil purposes."66 Also supportive of this critical observation:
"If the revenue agent has done work on the case before the special
agent enters the scene, he will make available to the special agent
the data he has collected and 'worked-up' . . . .67 It should also be
emphasized that the lack of advisement deemed violative in Mathis
was by a regular agent in the course of a civil investigation; albeit,
the suspect was in custody.
Still other alternatives may exist. Since the criminal tax case is
unique, as we have seen, it may well demand devising an approach
novel to contemporary procedural safeguards. It can be safely pre-
dicted that the law must move beyond the position of Mathis. It
must, of necessity, because Mathis leaves essentially the entire field
of criminal tax prosecutions untouched and much troubled.
Gerald P. McDermott
TORTS - SKIER LIABILITY - A SKIER WHO INJURES ANOTHER
MAY BE LIABLE IN TORT UNDER THE "LOOK BUT DON'T SEE"
RULE.-Ninio v. Hight, 385 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1967).
Plaintiff, Ida Ninio, was skiing at Aspen in a beginners' class.
Defendant, Donald Hight, skiing from above the group, rammed
into Mrs. Ninio, inflicting serious injury. Mrs. Ninio filed suit against
Hight for damages caused by his alleged negligence. Testimony at
the trial revealed that Hight had finished making a turn to the left
and "saw, sort of out of my field, ski pants and boots, and I didn't
have time to really look up."' On the basis of this evidence, plaintiff
argued that Hight was concededly in control; that had he looked
to his right he could have seen the group and avoided the collision;
and that his failure to see and heed the group's presence was negli-
gence as a matter of law. However, the trial court refused plaintiff's
request for special jury instructions and instructed the jury only on
"United States v. Carlson, 260 F. Supp. 423, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
65 Thomas v. United States, 386 U.S. 975 (1967).
66 United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
67 H. BALTER, supra note 1, § 3.3-2, at 14-15.
1 Ninio v. Hight, 385 F.2d 350, 351-52 (10th Cir. 1967).
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